Pancasikha are quoted. It can be said consequently that it looks up the (1) philosophy of Pancasikha as the authority. But now that the Yuktidipika (a commentary on the Samkhya-karika), a new source, has become the object of our attention, we can no longer entirely agree to what Vacaspa-(2) timisra says. P. Cakravarti pointed out that some of the fragments attributed to Pancasikha so far is ascribed to Varsaganya by the author of the Yuktidipika. He quotes in his commentary on YS. 2-15, 3-13 for example the following fragments in order to prove that a thing consists of Sukha, Duhkha and Moha that struggle one another: rupatisaya vrtty atisayas ca parasparena viruddhyante/samanyani tv atisayaih saha pravartante/This passage is, according to Vacaspatimisra, a fragment from Pancasikha. But the same passage appears in the Yuktidipika where it is ascribed to Varsa-
ganya himself. In a commentary on YS. 3-13, Vyasa quotes the views of four doctors of Abhidharma. Toward the end of the commentary, presenting a refutation of dharma and dharmin by Buddhists, he refutes it again
(1) P. Chakravarti ed., Yuktidipika, Calcutta 1938. We shall now consider the relation with the Samkhya, mainly the theory of recognition found in the Yoga-bhasya,. The Yoga-sutra 1-7 admits, as is wellknown, just like the Samkhya, the three pramanas: pratyaksa (perception), anumana (inference) and agama (verbal-communication) . In his commentary on this Sutra, Vyasa says with reference to the pratyaksa as follows: "Perception is that source-of-valid-ideas (which arises as a modification of the inner-organ) when the mind has been affected by some external thing through the channel of the sense-organs. This fluctuation is directly related to that (object), but, whereas the intended object consists of the general (samanya) and of the, particular (visesa), it (the fluctuation)
is chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the particular (the general being subordinate in perception of the particular)."(Bombay ed. p. 11 f).
In connection with the inference he says, "The inference is (that) fluctu.
(4) Taisho ed., vol. 29, p. 106 a.
(5) Taisho ed., vol. 29, p. 259 b.
-828-ation (of the mind) which refers to that relation which is present in things belonging to the same class as the inferred object (anumeya) and absent from things belonging to classes different (from that of the inferred object);
and it is chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the general." (ibid., p. 12). He says in another place, "The inference exhausts its force in bringing a general proposition to a conclussion, but is powerless to prove' a particular instance." (YBh. ad. YS. 1-25). He gives a comment as to the verbal-communication, too (p. 12). Our attention is attracted on his words that the verbal communication has the general for its object just like the inference (YBh. ad. YS. 1-49). Classifying all the phenomena into two categories, the particular (visesa) and the general (samanya), Vyasa regards the particular as the object of the pratyaksa and the generall as the object of anumana and agama. Such wording is not found in the Samkhya-karika.
Looking for Buddhism on the other hand, we find that this theory of Vyasa is of the similar kind to the theory of Dignaga and the later school of Buddhist logicians. Dignaga says in his work entitled Pramanasamuccayavrtti: "There are only two pramanas (the instrument of recognition), the pratyaksa and the anumana, for they have the two laksanas as its object.
There is no object of recognition that has other laksana than that of the self (sva) and the general (samanya). It is the, pratyaksa that has svalaksana for its object, while it is the anumana that has samanya-laksana for its (6) object. Thus it must be known." Though the term visesa is not used in the work of Dignaga, svalaksana and samanyalaksana are referred to in contrast. Therefore the term no doubt means the particular. If it was Dignaga that asserted for the first time such a theory in connection with the pratyaksa and the anumana, it can be said that Vyasa's theory of recognition (7) was influenced by Dignaga. As I discussed in another occasion, however, the author of the Yoga-bhasya refutes Dignaga's tri-amsa theory (grahaka, Besides the above-mentioned points the Yoga-bhasya and Vindhyavasin are similar in regard to such important views that both of them recognize only the inner-organ of the mind (manas) and not suksma-sarira. Now we can understand that the theory of Samkhya in the Yoga-bhasya was based on a Samkhya theory belonging to the line of Varsaganya. That was, I
suppose, why Vacaspati regarded Varsaganya the author of the Yoga-sastra.
In fact, the author of the Yoga-bhasya looked up Varsaganya as his authority because the latter had an inclination pretty Yogaic, in other words, he had a Samkhya-Yogaic, thought. Is that not the reason why his name is omitted in the traditional lineage of the Samkhya?
(10) Luigi Suali ed., Shaddarsana-Samucchaya, p. 108. 
